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FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0165
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 8090
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001082

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2026

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SUBJECT: SOMALIA: PARLIAMENT ADJOURNED; DONORS EXAMINE
SECURITY REQUESTS

REF: (A) NAIROBI 869, (B) Nairobi 949, (C) NAIROBI 924

CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK,
REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

SUMMARY

¶1. (C) The Somali Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) appears set to attempt the actual work of creating legislative committees and discussing the country's future. A risk that the TFP would tear itself apart over the fate of the Prime Minister seems to be receding, as MPs fear that finding someone to replace him would be too difficult. Donors traveled to Baidoa March 7 to discuss medium-term costs of a pilot security and stabilization scheme for the new "home" of the TFP, requiring international underwriting of the cantonment of local militias. Ongoing clan fighting in Mogadishu, much of it pitting an array of forces against Islamic Court-backed militias, risks reducing Baidoa to a political sideshow. END SUMMARY

SPEAKER'S TACTICAL RETREAT

¶2. (C) The first session of the TFP inside Somalia kicked off exactly as scheduled on February 26. At the end of the first day of the TFP session in Baidoa, Somalia Watcher's contacts at the session had confidently predicted that discussions of the agenda would proceed the next day, February 27 (ref A). In fact, deep divisions among the members of the TFP surfaced almost immediately. But the split is no longer along the old lines that pitted the TFG President, Prime Minister, and Minister for International Cooperation in Jowhar on one side against a group of warlord/MP/Ministers, lumped with civil society activists and the Speaker of the TFP in Mogadishu. Instead, it is between MPs who seek to bring down the Prime Minister, and those who fear the vacuum that may be created should he be removed from office.

¶3. (C) A week later, PM Gedi seems to have dodged the bullet. Before Baidoa, MPs thought that the agenda-setting battle would center on whether the TFP would make the first

order of business the removal of Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi and the non-functioning Council of Ministers. They speculated privately that TFP Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden had cut deals with President Yusuf and Gedi, trying to avoid tearing the institutions apart by frontal political attack against individuals or their clans. They expressed the fear that, with Gedi brought down, there would be a brutal fight to try to find a replacement from the Hawiye clans. (NOTE: There is no obvious candidate available in either of the powerful Abgal or Haber Gedir sub clans -- and the currently mooted front runner, Minister for National Security and warlord Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, is unacceptable as being (a) from the small Hawiye sub clan of the Murosade, and (b) engaged in combat operations with both the Abgal and the Haber Gedir. END NOTE.)

¶4. (C) That the Speaker adjourned the TFP session fewer than 36 hours after its opening could certainly be due to the absence of completed shelters where the session was to have taken place. Nonetheless, Sharif Hassan made it clear to the press that a key reason was to give the TFP members time to begin sorting out exactly what they wanted to do now that they were assembled in one place at one time.

¶5. (C) The Speaker reconvened the MPs on March 6 and it appears that the TFP has focused entirely on naming members to the various parliamentary committees, with a commitment to create as many committees as necessary to ensure that every one of the 211 MPs present are members of one. If nothing else, direct confrontation has so far been avoided.

BUILDING SECURITY

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¶6. (C) Efforts to establish security in Baidoa received a significant boost through a well-organized TFI lobbying campaign for donor support. The Danish Chair of the Somalia Donor's Group received on February 28 a letter from PM Gedi, requesting urgent (and substantial) assistance in building an environment of security in Baidoa for the medium term (defined as one to three months). A small group of donors had agreed by March 2 to travel to Baidoa to discuss the request with relevant ministers, MPs, the President and Speaker. Although the trip was postponed as information on the abduction of a UNICEF international (AmCit) employee hit the press (Reftels B and C), the group did travel on March 17. Meanwhile, Somali politicians created three committees on Baidoa security.

(A) The Security Supervisory Committee (which brings together the three major Rahanweyn Mirifle warlords in the Baidoa area with the Minister of Defense and five soldiers still carrying ranks from the Siyad Barre-era armed forces):

- Hassan Mohamed Nur (AKA "Shatigudud"), Minister of Agriculture and Committee Chairman
- Adan Mohammad Nur (AKA "Adan Madobe"), Minister of Justice
- Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade, MP, Baidoa Warlord
- Abdirahman Mahamud Ali, Minister of Defense
- LTGEN Ismail Qassin Naji
- BGEN Abducadir Ali Diriye
- BGEN Ali Mohamed Hassan Loyan
- BGEN Bashir Mohamed Jama
- COL Mohamed Sheikh Madobe

(B) The Security Logistics Committee (two members):

- Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade, MP, Baidoa Warlord and now head of "Logistics Administration"
- Sherif Amin Ali Mohamed, named "Storekeeper of the Ministry of National Assets of the TFG"

(C) The Regional Security Committee of Bay and Bakol

Regions:

-- Aden Mohamed Nur (AKA "Saransor"), a significant warlord in the area.
-- Abshir Hussen Ali (Gab), Unknown to Somalia Watcher
-- Hassan Moallim Ahmed (Bikolo), Unknown to Somalia Watcher
-- Khalif Sheikh Abdullahi, Unknown to Somalia Watcher
-- Hassan Adan Bullo, Unknown to Somalia Watcher
-- Isak Malas, Unknown to Somalia Watcher
-- Abdullahi Ibrahim Abdi (Karkadey), Unknown to Somalia Watcher

A PLAN

¶7. (C) March 3 saw the delivery to donors of a draft "Encampment Plan for the Militia and other Armed Units in Bay and Bakool Units", signed by Security Committee members LTGEN Ismail Qassin Naji, BGEN Ali Mohamed Hassan (AKA "Loyan"), BGEN Bashir Mohamed Jama, COL Mohamed Sheikh Madobe, and Aden Mohamed Nur (AKA "Saransor").

¶8. (C) The encampment plan concludes that the rapid pace of developments since January and the serious need for assistance to establish a permissive security environment justifies donor financing to build a Baidoa security apparatus in the absence of the kind of full disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program normally required for many donors to be able to contribute. The document stresses that the "Technical Security Task Force" - - apparently synonymous with the three committees set forth above -- must address the security challenge by keeping armed militias out of Baidoa proper. Noting some 3,000 militiamen belonging to Bakool/Bay warlords Habsade, Shatigudud, and Adan Madobe already encamped 25 kms southeast of Baidoa at a defunct military base in the town

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of Daynuunay, the encampment plan called for dividing these and any other militias into 4 camps outside the city. These four camps would require food and water support estimated at \$3 per man per day -- a starting price tag of nearly \$10,000/day. Further costs would include clothing, equipping, and encamping 500 security personnel drawn from the three warlord's forces, with payment of \$3 per diem to rank-and-file policemen, \$7 for the 30 officers among them. Renovation of the Baidoa Police Division HQ, the Central Police Station, the Central Prison, and 6 sub-stations are proposed.

COMMENT

¶9. (C) PM Gedi's staying power is curious. Although he is vaguely useful to the TFIs as a Prime Minister coming from the powerful Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiye, he is not seen as able to deliver the broad plurality of his own Warsangeli sub-sub-clan, let alone of the Hawiye clan. Perhaps Yusuf thinks he needs to keep Gedi (as well as Jurile) because Italy wants them kept, and Italy is ready to continue financing the TFIs (with cash and in kind) notwithstanding the international community's qualms and desires to "first, do no harm". But if nothing else, removing Gedi means a vacuum in the PM's chair, and likely a complete removal of the Council of Ministers. Filling that vacuum means finding a PM from among the Hawiye, either the Abgal or the Haber Gedir, a process that could lead to a major political fight within the TFP, and perhaps feed the clan military fighting in Mogadishu.

¶10. (C) Sub-clans of the Hawiye are still in a face-off over control of the capital. Key warlord/minister/MP members of the "Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Combat against International Terrorism" are fully employed trying to ensure their survival, and/or to roll back the Islamic Court/Ayr militias whose strength and public support have

remained considerable. With such a cloud hanging over Mogadishu, the playing of politics in Baidoa risks becoming a less-than-relevant sideshow. END COMMENT.

BELLAMY.